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 Context: underfunding of need in context of armed conflicts being ever greater (co-)source 
of humanitarian crisis  
o In 2016, 402 conflicts were ongoing, compared with 278 in 2006 (WHDT, 2017) 
o $7.8 billion in underfunding of consolidated inter-agency appeals in 2016 (WHDT, 
2017) 
 
 Arms trade tax proposals over the last 35 years have tended to focus on connecting tax 
revenue to either development or peace-building 
o E.g. Lula in 2008 at the G8 meeting in Evian when he called for a global hunger fund 
and said: “There are many ways of gaining financial resources for such a fund. Taxes 
could be levied on the international arms trade: this would prove advantageous from 
both an economic and an ethical standpoint." (Burrows, “Arms and the Taxman”, 
2003. Support from Jacques Chirac and Kofi Annan. 
o E.g. “The financial volume of the arms trade can be estimated at about USD$100 
billion per year, so even a comparatively small tax, say 10 per cent, could cover all of 
the costs of UN Peacekeeping (US $7,8 billion for fiscal year 2016-2017) with quite 
some money to spare.” (Broszka, “A Tax on the Arms Trade to Fund Peace Building”, 
2017 
 
 Proposal here is to create a narrowed focus on humanitarian assistance funding via arms 
trade taxing/tithing, which has development and peace-building elements but has an even 
tighter nexus to effects of arms production >> trade >> use 
o E.g.: in 2016, only 16% of humanitarian assistance funding requests for de-mining 
were met (WHDT, 2017) 
o  “In general, an arms trade tax makes more sense as a measure for disarmament or 
the compensation of victims than as a source of development finance.” (Brzoska, 
Taxation of arms trade, 2001/2004)  
o Arms trade has combined causal and moral links to humanitarian crises such that 
we can consider a form of corrective justice (not just distributive justice) to be in play 
alongside deep pockets to tap into  
o $100 billion in arms sales annually (Amnesty Int’l, Killer facts, 2015, quoting SIPRI 
data) 
o what I will call a Global / Humanitarian Strife Tax (G/HST) of 8% would yield the 







 Range of taxation possibilities, none straightforward and all will be resisted tooth and nail, 
notably >>>: e.g. 
 
1. Excise taxes (tax on manufacturers) and/or transaction/sale taxes (another 
sectoral version of Tobin Tax on global financial transactions) – one view > 
Landau Report to French President Chirac, 2004: “A tax on arms would have to 
be levied on all purchases -whether domestic or international – and 
implemented by all producing countries in the world to be morally significant 
and economically non-distortionary.”   
 
2. Globalized business tax: direct taxes (including ‘just’ a surtax, while 
leaving rest of business-tax structure as is) on global corporate profits - Landau 
report, 2004: “A surtax on the profits of multinationals could be seen as a normal 
counterpart to the benefits they derive from globalization.”  
 
3. Import/export taxes on business or country “quasi-tax” (levy by 
international institution on exporting state; note 88% of arms trade from the 
Security Council P5 countries of US, Russia, France, China and UK) 
 
 Arms traders (which include considerable state ownership and investment), law firm/tax 
industry lobbyists are powerful and specific arms-trade-shielding countries like the 
Netherlands (the world’s leading tax haven for arms companies: top 6 of 10 based there) and 
also the P5 will fight tooth and nail against efforts 
o Note how US Congress passed Helms-Biden law in 1999 to prohibit US funding of 
UN if any initiative to discuss global taxation 
• Yet, “arms traders” are minimally sympathetic if the right advocacy campaign 
is run and some leading state sponsors push for this 
 
 Recent Arms Trade Treaty may create opening 
 
o “Support for an arms trade tax (or further thinking on it) has so far been limited to 
prominent individuals, former politicians and expert commissions. Although it does 
not seem to have been discussed in the negotiation process of the ATT, the treaty 
might provide new momentum for discussion of an arms trade tax. However, as the 
ATT clearly distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate international trade in 
arms (the latter is not permitted), the link to the harmfulness of the transfers that 
have been licensed by governments is not immediately obvious. However, there are 
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strong arguments for such a link, such as the later misuse of arms that had been 
delivered earlier under different circumstances, or through the retransfer of arms. 
The empirical foundation for these arguments could be made stronger through 
additional research.” Brzoska, Participant Reflection-Core Issues of An Arms Trade Tax, 
2017 
o Canada still has not signed let alone acceded; Bill C-47 (2018) as implementing 
legislation at House committee stage 
• CADSI 2013 Canadian Defence and Security Directory of military companies has 
322 pages of entries for 495 CADSI members 
 
 Most radical may be a direct business tax on global profits (especially if a full tax versus 
a surtax) 
o Rixen,”The Case for Global Tax Governance,” 2009 Global Governance = one of first 
major discussions in social science of taxing MNEs as single global entities using the 
Unitary Taxation with Formula Apportionment (UT+FA) method used to tax 
corporations that is used in some federations 
o Nature of multinational corporate activity and tax minimization (aka: 
dodging/evading) strategies through shell company structures, transfer pricing, etc 
 
• Produces overall unfairly high profits and distribution of wealth to global 
affluent 
 Note e.g. Microsoft made $12.3 billion in profits globally in 1999 but paid 
zero taxes: Brock, G., ‘International taxation’, in S. Benatar and G. Brock, 
eds. Global Health and Global Health Ethics (Cambridge Univ. Press: 
Cambridge, 2011) 
• While DCs counter-act by spreading tax base to national small business and 
salaried workers, special negative effect on revenues of LDCs: Rixen,”The Case 
for Global Tax Governance” 
 
 Arms trade shares most of the features that warrant global business tax + there are 
special moral and causal reasons why it deserves early attention as a source of dedicated 
funding for the victims of armed conflict and for associated humanitarian assistance 
o Includes evidence that 40% of costs of corruption globally are tied to arms trade: 







 Possible Canada leadership (or Canada-France-Brazil-Costa Rica) leadership under 
OECD rubric? 
o OECD functions as a sort of tax policy and MNE governance think-tank 
including on global tax, e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), Financing Development: Aid and Beyond (OECD: Paris, 2007), 
pp. 75–76.  
o Appeal to the Canadian leadership on Ottawa anti-mines treaty  
o Trojan horse possibility: some governments (especially the Nordics) may see this 
as right kind of beta/pilot for testing UT+FA global business tax writ large  
o including as one way to test how to divert money away from tax havens (that the 
arms trade uses in extenso: Broek, Tax Evasion and Weapon Production (Transnational 
Institute, 2016) 
  
 Alternative or precursor: Can be started as a moral suasion campaign, using evolving 
big-data and communications tools to estimate what leading companies have made in 
profit and what either G/HST indirect-tax or direct-tax surtax could look like 
o Then, humanitarian invoices could be delivered to companies with transnational civil 
society mobilization (possibly with some brave UN OCHA partnering) to lobby for 
the requisite ‘voluntary’ donations to UN OCHA funds incl the Start Fund 
o In terms of data,  
• note e.g. that the 2016 Transnational Institute report showed Netherlands harbours 
6 of the top 10 arms companies was generated using Netherlands Chamber of 
Commerce data 
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